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Abstract
Recent evidence underlines the importance of demand frictions distorting insur-
ance choices. Heterogeneous frictions cause the willingness to pay for insurance to
be biased upward (relative to value) for those purchasing insurance, but downward
for those who remain uninsured. The paper integrates this nding with standard
methods for evaluating welfare in insurance markets and demonstrates how wel-
fare conclusions regarding adversely selected markets are a¤ected. The demand
frictions framework also makes qualitatively di¤erent predictions about the desir-
ability of policies like insurance subsidies and mandates, commonly used to tackle
adverse selection.
Keywords: Heterogeneity, Adverse Selection, Demand Frictions, Insurance
Market Interventions
JEL-codes: D60, D82, D83, G28
1 Introduction
Adverse selection due to heterogeneity in risks has been considered a prime reason
for governments to intervene in insurance markets. The classic argument is that the
presence of higher risk types increases insurance premia and drives lower risk types
out of the market (Akerlof 1970). However, empirical work has found surprisingly
little evidence supporting the importance of adverse selection in insurance markets.
An individuals risk type often plays a limited role in explaining his or her demand for
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insurance, which raises the important question what type of heterogeneity is actually
driving the variation in insurance demand. Recent work attributes the unexplained
variation to heterogeneity in preferences (Cohen and Einav 2007, Einav, Finkelstein
and Cullen 2010a, Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf 2010b) and nds that the estimated
welfare cost of ine¢ cient pricing due to adverse selection is small. Since the foregone
value of insurance for the uninsured is estimated to be low, heterogeneity in preferences
tends to reduce the scope for policy interventions in insurance markets.
A parallel and growing empirical literature, however, shows the importance of vari-
ous types of frictions driving the demand for insurance. Examples are limited cognitive
ability (Fang, Keane and Silverman 2008), biased risk perceptions (Abaluck and Gru-
ber 2011), inertia (Handel 2013) and information frictions (Handel and Kolstad 2015).1
These demand frictions provide an alternative explanation for why risks do not explain
the variation in the demand for insurance, but, in contrast with preferences, drive a
wedge between the true value of insurance and the value of insurance as revealed by an
individuals demand. The presence of demand frictions thus a¤ects the earlier welfare
estimates and policy recommendations assuming preference heterogeneity.
This paper presents a stylized framework with demand frictions to analyze policy
and welfare in insurance markets. Heterogeneous frictions, just like heterogeneous risks,
a¤ect the sorting of individuals along the demand curve. Under reasonable and testable
assumptions, this causes the demand curve to overstate the true insurance value for
those with high willingness to pay and vice versa. The paper integrates this insight
with now standard methods for welfare analysis in insurance markets that have ignored
demand frictions (see Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen, 2010a). A key contribution of this
novel approach is that it allows to draw data-based welfare conclusions that deviate
from revealed preferences, without relying on specic assumptions on the structural
wedge between revealed and true value or on individual-level analysis of frictions like
in Bernheim and Rangel (2009).
The paper starts by establishing the systematic relationship between the true and
revealed value of insurance in the presence of frictions. At the heart of the analysis is
a simple selection e¤ect. Consider the case where some individuals underestimate the
risk to which they are exposed, while others overestimate this. Or, alternatively, some
individuals underestimate the coverage provided by an insurance contract, while others
overestimate this. The underestimation tends to discourage individuals from buying
insurance, which implies that those who decided not to buy insurance are more likely
to underestimate its value and vice versa.2 This selection e¤ect does not depend on
the specic nature of the underlying frictions. The demand curve, which reveals indi-
1 In addition to behavioral frictions, there are also examples of economic constraints distorting
the insurance demand, like liquidity constraints (Cole et al. 2012, Gruber 2005), price distortions due
the presence of publicly provided programs (Brown and Finkelstein 2008).
2The selection e¤ect when considering an expected value conditional on a particular choice or
outcome is structurally similar to the mechanisms underlying for example the winners curse, regression
towards to the mean, and choice-driven optimism (Van Den Steen 2004).
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vidualswillingness-to-pay for insurance, overstates the insurance value for the insured
individuals and understates the (potential) insurance value for the uninsured individ-
uals. I analyze the robustness of this selection e¤ect and provide testable conditions
under which frictions indeed reduce the gradient of insurance value with respect to
willingness-to-pay.
The policy implications of this selection e¤ect are immediate. The evaluation of
policy interventions which have either all insured or all uninsured as targets will be
unambiguously biased in opposite directions when this evaluation relies on individuals
revealed preferences. In particular, the welfare gain of a universal mandate to buy
insurance is unambiguously higher than the demand for insurance would suggest. While
the described selection e¤ect is not particular to the demand for insurance, demand
frictions are shown to be empirically important in insurance markets and insurance
mandates are omnipresent as well.
The second part of the paper integrates the systematic relationship between revealed
and true value driven by demand frictions into the standard welfare analysis of adversely
selected insurance markets  the central issue in the recent insurance literature.3 In
particular, in the absence of demand frictions, the welfare cost of adverse selection
depends only on the relation between the demand and its corresponding cost curves,
as shown by Einav et al. (2010a).4 I extend their su¢ cient statistics approach for
demand frictions, which cause the welfare-relevant value curve to be a counter-clockwise
rotation of the demand curve, and I show that their impact is accounted for by one
additional statistic, namely the share of the residual variation in insurance demand -
left unexplained by heterogeneity in risks - that is driven by frictions rather than by
preferences.
To estimate the exact share of frictions extra information would be required in
addition to the information used to estimate the demand and cost curves. Other than
that, the welfare analysis can simply build on existing empirical estimates of the demand
and cost curves. The framework thus provides a simple, yet robust approach to evaluate
the robustness of standard welfare conclusions, even when the relevant demand frictions
are not exactly known. I illustrate this in a numerical example based on the empirical
analysis of employer-provided health insurance in Einav et al. (2010a). I nd that
for plausible values of the friction share the market ine¢ ciency is in fact substantially
higher and would justify government interventions. The estimated welfare cost due to
ine¢ cient pricing doubles when twenty-ve percent of the residual variation in demand
is driven by frictions.
The nal part of the paper uses the framework with demand frictions to revisit the
3See Einav, Finkelstein and Levin (2010c), Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) for recent reviews.
4See also Hackmann, Kolstad and Kowalski (2015) for a recent implementation of this approach in
the context of the Massachusetts health reform. The stylized model in Einav et al. (2010a) has been
extended to imperfect competition (Mahoney and Weyl, 2014), for endogenous contract characteristics
(Veiga and Weyl, 2015) and multiple contracts (Azevedo and Gottlieb, 2015).
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desirability of various policy interventions in insurance markets and nds qualitatively
di¤erent predictions about which policies are preferred. I further illustrate these qual-
itative di¤erences using some numerical examples. A rst key nding is that frictions
reduce the e¤ectiveness of insurance subsidies relative to insurance mandates. While
price policies are constrained by the individualswillingness to insure, the welfare im-
pact depends on the true insurance value. When frictions reduce the willingness to
insure of individuals who should be buying insurance, larger subsidies are required to
encourage them to actually buy insurance. Relatedly, frictions also reduce the e¤ective-
ness of risk-rated premiums. Compared to uniform price subsidies, risk-rating adjusts
the insurance price to reect individual-specic risks and aims to correct an individ-
uals insurance decision for the cost externality she imposes on insurers. The potential
e¢ ciency gain may be high (see Bundord, Levin and Manhoney 2012), but the real-
ization of this gain crucially depends on the individual-specic risks being perceived
accurately and not being neutralized by other demand frictions. Otherwise, risk-rating
introduces the ine¢ ciency it is supposed to correct.
The fact that people over- or underinsure due to demand frictions naturally calls for
alternative policy interventions that directly address these frictions.5 Examples are the
provision of information or the standardization of contracts through government-run
insurance exchanges. Such interventions make individuals better o¤ at a given price,
but the equilibrium price may change as the selection of individuals into insurance is
a¤ected.6 I illustrate the potentially opposite e¤ects on welfare within the framework
with demand frictions by contrasting two policies that provide individual-specic in-
formation to individuals about their mean expenses and the variance of their expenses
respectively.
Related Literature Starting with the work by Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2000),
several papers have tested for the presence of adverse selection in di¤erent insurance
markets. The weak relationship between risk and insurance choice, reviewed in Cohen
and Siegelman (2010), inspired a new series of studies which estimate the heterogeneity
in risk preferences jointly with the heterogeneity in risk types (Cohen and Einav, 2007;
Einav et al. 2010a, 2010b). The estimated heterogeneity allows one to move beyond
testing for adverse selection and actually analyze the welfare cost of ine¢ cient pricing.
This cost is generally found to be small (see Einav et al. 2010c).
While attributing heterogeneity in insurance choices - unexplained by heterogene-
ity in risks - to heterogeneity in preferences is a natural rst step and in line with
the revealed preference paradigm, the empirical evidence supporting this approach is
limited.7 Several papers have recently made the case that insurance behavior cannot
5See Congdon et al. (2011), Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) for recent discussions
6Condon, Kling and Mullainathan (2011) also discuss the potential welfare loss when people are
better informed about their risks. Handel (2013) provides an empirical welfare analysis of a similar
trade-o¤ for a nudging policy when peoples decisions are subject to switching costs or inertia.
7A few papers use explicit measures of risk preferences to explain insurance choices (e.g., Cutler,
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be adequately explained with standard preferences and beliefs.8 A large literature in
psychology documents more generally how choices under risk are subject to biases and
heuristics.9 In the context of insurance, a growing number of empirical papers ana-
lyze deviations from expected utility maximization in explaining insurance choices. For
example, Abaluck and Gruber (2011) and Barghava et al. (2015) identify important in-
consistencies in insurance choices and document that dominated options are frequently
chosen. By complementing insurance data with surveys, Fang et al. (2008) nd that
heterogeneity in cognitive ability is important (relative to risk aversion) in explaining
the choice of elderly to buy Medigap, while Handel and Kolstad (2015) document the
importance of information frictions in explaining the choice of health insurance plans.
Barseghyan et al. (2012) nd that a structural model with distorted probabilities ex-
plains the data better than a model with standard risk aversion looking at deductible
choices in auto and house insurance.10 As mentioned before, not only behavioral bi-
ases, but also economic constraints can cause the relation between insurance choice and
insurance values to be tenuous (e.g., Gruber 2005, Cole et al. 2012).
Accounting for demand frictions when analyzing welfare and policy interventions
in insurance markets seems the natural next step in light of the evidence above. This
is the step undertaken in this paper. The analysis follows two recent trends in pub-
lic economics; the rst is the inclusion of non-standard decision makers (or demand
frictions more generally) in welfare analysis, the second is the expression of optimal
policies in terms of su¢ cient statistics.11 In a similar spirit, Chetty, Kroft and Looney
(2009) extend the su¢ cient statistics approach to tax policy for tax salience and Spin-
newijn (2015) extends the su¢ cient statistics approach to unemployment policy for
biased perceptions of employment prospects. Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Con-
gdon (2012) propose a unifying framework to examine the implications of behavioral
biases for social insurance and optimal taxation. In contrast with previous work, the
focus in this paper is on heterogeneity in behavioral frictions and how this underlies
the demand for insurance. Using the framework with heterogeneous frictions, Handel,
Kolstad and Spinnewijn (2015) study their interaction with pricing ine¢ ciencies in
employer-provided health plans and evaluate the positive and normative implications
of demand and supply-side interventions.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model
Finkelstein and McGarry 2008), but the estimated role of these preference measures is often minor
(e.g., Fang et al. 2008). Heterogeneity in risk preferences should a¤ect an individuals insurance
choices across di¤erent domains similarly, but recent work nds rather limited evidence for domain-
general components (Barseghyan et al., 2011, and Einav et al., 2011).
8For example, Chiappori and Salanié (2012) emphasize the importance of understanding risk percep-
tions to analyze insurance behavior. Cutler and Zeckhauser (2004) argue that distorted risk perceptions
are one of the main reasons why some insurance markets do not work e¢ ciently.
9See Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Slovic (2000) for seminal contributions to this literature.
10Other examples in this spirit are Bruhin et al. (2010), Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) and Sydnor
(2010).
11See Chetty (2009), Congdon et al. (2011) and Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) for recent discussions.
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of insurance demand with frictions and characterizes the di¤erence between true and
revealed insurance values along the demand curve. Section 3 introduces heterogeneity
in risk types and preferences to analyze and calibrate the cost of adverse selection
depending on the presence of frictions. Section 4 analyzes how frictions a¤ect the
e¤ectiveness of the relevant government interventions in insurance markets. Section 5
concludes.
2 Insurance Demand with Frictions
This section introduces a stylized model of insurance demand with demand frictions.
The analysis deviates from the revealed preference paradigm by allowing the variation
in insurance choices to be also driven by heterogeneous frictions, unrelated to the
true insurance value. We establish a systematic di¤erence between the true value of
insurance and the value as revealed by an individuals demand. It is this systematic
relationship that we exploit to revisit standard welfare and policy analysis in insurance
markets in the subsequent sections.
2.1 Stylized Model
Individuals decide whether or not to buy insurance against a risk. All individuals are
o¤ered a single contract at price p. Individuals, however, di¤er in several dimensions.
They have di¤erent preferences, risk types, perceptions, cognitive ability, wealth, liq-
uidity, etc. For any individual i, these characteristics jointly determine the true value
of insurance vi and the revealed value of insurance v^i. The true value vi refers to the
actual insurance value for the individual and is assumed to be relevant for welfare. The
revealed value v^i equals the maximum price at which the individual buys insurance and
thus reects the individuals insurance demand.12 That is, individual i buys insurance
if and only if v^i  p, but would maximize her utility by buying insurance if and only if
vi  p.13 I denote the di¤erence between the true and revealed value by a simple noise
term
"i  v^i   vi.
This di¤erence is driven by individual-specic demand frictions. Hence, both hetero-
geneity in the true valuations and heterogeneity in the frictions drive the heterogeneity
in the demand for insurance across individuals. I denote the cumulative distribution
of any variable x by Fx and the mean and variance by x and 
2
x. The correlation
between variables x and y is denoted by x;y.
12The wedge between the revealed and true values corresonds to the wedge between the decision
utility(inferred from an agents decisions) and experienced utility(referring to the hedonic experience)
to the extent that the latter is deemed relevant for evaluating welfare (see Kahneman and Thaler 2006).
13The revealed and true values of insurance are expressed as certainty equivalents to be directly
comparable to the insurance price.
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The share of individuals buying insurance at price p equals D (p) = 1 Fv^ (p). The
demand curve reects the marginal buyerswillingness to pay D 1 (q) for any level of
market coverage q. This revealed value is di¤erent from the true value in the presence of
frictions. The expected true value for the marginal buyers at price p equals E (vjv^ = p),
which I denote by MV (p).14 Graphically, one can construct the value curve, depicting
this marginal true valueMV
 
D 1 (q)

for any level of market coverage q, and compare
this to the demand curve. The wedge between the two curves determines the bias in
the welfare analysis by a Revealed Preference (RP) policy maker, who uses the demand
curve rather than the value curve to evaluate welfare.
The following stylized examples illustrate how empirically relevant frictions could
t well in this stylized framework. I will refer back to these examples when interpreting
the main results.
Example 1 (Inaccurate Perceptions) The value of insurance depends on an indi-
viduals risk exposure. The individual misperceives the value of an insurance contract
when she misperceives either the risk she is exposed to (e.g., Sydnor 2010, Barseghyan
et al. 2012) or the coverage provided by the contract (e.g., Harris and Keane 1999,
Handel and Kolstad 2015). Consider an insurance contract covering expenses with
mean i and variance 
2
i . For an individual with mean-variance preferences with pa-
rameter of risk aversion i, the true value of insurance equals vi = i +
i
2 
2
i .
15 The
noise term equals "i = ^i   i if she misperceives the mean and "i = i2
 
^2i   2i

if
she misperceives the variance.
Example 2 (Inertia) An individuals willingness to insure depends on her default
option, determined by her own prior choices or her employers choice on her behalf
(e.g., Handel 2013). Consider the individual-specic cost si reecting an individuals
inertia to deviate from the default. If the default is to be uninsured, individual i buys
insurance if vi  p+ si and thus "i =  si. If the default is to be insured, the individual
buys insurance if vi  p  si and thus "i = si.
Example 3 (Bounded Rationality) Choices under uncertainty are complex and in-
surance plans are di¢ cult to understand. Di¤erent individuals are more or less able to
choose the utility-maximizing plan (e.g., Fang et al. 2008, Abaluck and Gruber 2011).
Consider a share  of individuals who are boundedly rationaland imitate the choice
of some (rational) peer j with valuation vj so that "i = vj   vi. If the peers value
14 Individuals with the same revealed value may have di¤erent true values. Using their unweighted
average to evaluate welfare implies that in the absence of frictions, total welfare is captured by the
consumer surplus.
15The insurance values are exactly equal to the certainty equivalents when individuals have CARA
preferences with  the parameter of absolute risk aversion and when the contract covers a normally
distributed risk. The assumption of CARA preferences or additivity of the risk premium in the valuation
of a contract is very common in the recent empirical insurance literature (see the review by Einav et
al. 2010c).
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is uncorrelated to the own value, the correlation between the revealed and true values
equals .
I make two assumptions to focus the analysis. First, I assume that only the true
value is relevant for welfare and policy analysis. Depending on the policy interventions
and the frictions considered, some weight could be given to the revealed value as well.
For example, in case of inaccurate perceptions, one could argue that when di¤erent
insurance valuations are caused only by di¤erent perceptions of the underlying risk
(and not by di¤erent perceptions of the actual coverage provided) they should not be
considered as frictions at all.16 In case of inertia or bounded rationality, switching
or processing costs could be relevant for price policies used to encourage individuals
to change contracts, but are arguably irrelevant when mandating an insurance plan.
While this caveat should be accounted for in practice, using only true values to evaluate
welfare in this stylized framework simply sharpens the contrast with standard Revealed
Preference analysis. Second, the main focus is on the case in which the impact of the
frictions on the revealed value cancels out on average. That is, E (") = 0 and thus
E (v^) = E (v). In general, frictions a¤ect di¤erent people di¤erently, but they may
also drive the revealed value in one particular direction relative to the true value. For
example, risk perceptions may be noisy, but also optimistically biased on average and
thus reduce the demand for insurance. Similarly, frictions driven by liquidity constraints
will unambiguously reduce the demand for insurance. This second assumption sharpens
the focus on the heterogeneity in frictions, but the analysis naturally extends when
frictions introduce an average bias, which would simply increase or decrease the wedge
caused by the heterogeneity in frictions depending on its sign.
2.2 Demand vs. Welfare
Demand frictions a¤ect the sorting of individuals with di¤erent valuation along the
demand curve. We now analyze how individualstrue value relates to their willingness-
to-pay or, graphically, how the value curve relates to the demand curve. I establish
a systematic relationship between the two starting with strong assumptions, but then
show how the results generalize when relaxing these assumptions.
I start by comparing the true and revealed insurance value for two infra-marginal
groups: the insured and the uninsured.
Proposition 1 When frictions are independently distributed and E (") = 0, the de-
mand curve overestimates the insurance value for the insured and underestimates the
insurance value for the uninsured. That is,
E ("jv^  p)  0  E ("jv^ < p) for any p. (1)
16See for example the subjective expected utility theory in Savage (1954).
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The Proposition implies that the di¤erence between the true and revealed value
is unambiguously biased in opposite directions for the insured and uninsured. The
robustness of this result does not rely on the independence assumption, as I will show
shortly, but on a simple selection e¤ect; frictions that a¤ect the decision to buy insur-
ance will be di¤erently represented among the insured and the uninsured. Even though
frictions cancel out over the entire population, they do not conditional on the decision
to buy insurance. For example, overly optimistic beliefs about the risk exposure dis-
courage individuals from buying insurance, while overly pessimistic beliefs encourage
individuals to buy insurance. Those buying insurance are thus more likely to be too
pessimistic, while those who do not buy insurance are more likely to be too optimistic,
even when beliefs are unbiased on average.
This simple argument has important policy consequences. The selection e¤ect un-
ambiguously signs the mistake an RP-policy maker who uses the demand curve to
evaluate welfare consequences of policy interventions targeting either all the insured or
all the uninsured. He overestimates the value generated in the insurance market and
underestimates the potential value of insurance for the uninsured. As a consequence,
universal insurance mandates, central in the insurance policy debate, are always un-
derappreciated. In contrast, the cost of a policy a¤ecting all insured individuals, like
banning the insurance product, is always overestimated.
The selection mechanism suggests that, on average, people with a high revealed
value are more likely to overestimate the value of insurance than people with a low
revealed value. To establish that higher revealed values always signal stronger overes-
timation of the true values, a positive monotone likelihood ratio property is required:
Property MLRP. For any v^1  v^2, "1  "2, f(v^1j"1)f(v^1j"2) 
f(v^2j"1)
f(v^2j"2) :
The MLRP is satised by a large class of distributions including the normal distribution
(see Milgrom 1981) and implies the following result:
Proposition 2 When frictions satisfy MLRP, the demand curve overestimates the
true value for the marginal buyers more, the higher the price. That is,
@
@p
E ("jv^ = p)  0. (2)
The proposition allows to evaluate more targeted policies (e.g., a price subsidy),
which only a¤ect the choice of some agents. The result has again important policy
implications: an RP-policy maker is more likely to underestimate (overestimate) the
value of extending the market coverage q, the more (less) individuals are already buying
insurance. For symmetric distributions and E (") = 0, the RP-policy maker underesti-
mates the marginal value of insurance if and only if the market coverage q exceeds 50
percent.
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Figure 1: Demand Curve vs. Value Curve: Counter-Clockwise Rotation
Graphical representation Proposition 2 implies that the value curve is a counter-
clockwise rotation of the demand curve as illustrated in Figure 1.17 Denote by px the
price at which the demand curve and value curve intersect (i.e., px = MV (px)). The
value curve lies below the demand curve when prices are higher than px and above the
demand curve when prices are lower than px. The di¤erence between the two curves is
monotone in the price. The counter-clockwise rotation also implies that the area to the
left of any q is larger below the demand curve than below the value curve, while to the
right of any q it is smaller. That is, condition (2) implies condition (1) for E (") = 0,
but the opposite does not necessarily hold.
Best linear predictor The two Propositions provide a sharp characterization of the
relation between demand and value curve, but rely on strong assumptions. The result
that the value curve tends to be a counter-clockwise rotation of the value curve extends
beyond these assumptions.
To see this note that the value curve - plotting the conditional expected true value
E (vjv^ = p) for each price - is the best predictor of the true value as a function of the
revealed value v^. The best linear predictor equals
L (vjv^) = v +
cov (v; v^)
var (v^)
(v^   v^) .
This indicates that the ratio of the covariance between true and revealed value relative
17Note that Johnson and Myatt (2006) analyze shifts and rotations of the demand curve when
marketing and advertizing changes the (unconditional) distribution of the value of insurance. In their
analysis, rotations are caused by changes in the variance of the insurance value. In this analysis, the
value curve is also a rotation of the demand curve, but coming from the di¤erence between the revealed
values and the conditional expectation of the true values, which implies that the correlation between
the two distributions matters.
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to the variance in revealed value captures the average co-movement between value and
demand. This ratio depends on the correlation and the relative dispersion of the true
and revealed values,
cov (v; v^)
var (v^)
= v;v^ 
v
v^
.
In case of normal heterogeneity, this ratio fully determines the co-movement at any
revealed value v^ as the conditional expectation equals the best linear predictor, i.e.,
E (vjv^) = L (vjv^). We can state the following result:
Corollary 1 If value and frictions are normally distributed and E (") = 0, conditions
(1) and (2) hold if and only if v;v^ 
v
v^
 1.
Heterogeneous frictions, whether they are independent or not, reduce the correla-
tion v;v^ between the true and revealed of insurance below one. For example, with
heterogeneous risk perceptions, we expect the correlation v;v^ to be imperfect as long
as learning is incomplete.18 Similarly, with bounded rationality, the share of boundedly
rational types would determine how far the correlation v;v^ is below 1. The reduced
correlation unambiguously reduces the extent to which the true value co-varies with
the revealed value below one-for-one and rotates the value curve counter-clockwise rel-
ative to the demand curve. However, heterogeneous frictions also a¤ect the dispersion
in true values relative to the dispersion in revealed values. If frictions decrease the
relative dispersion v=v^, they further decrease the extent to which the true value co-
varies with the perceived value. This is the case when frictions are independent of the
true values. An increase of this relative dispersion would require a su¢ ciently large
negative correlation between the two. Moreover, to actually reverse the inequalities in
the Propositions, the e¤ect through the reduced dispersion would need to dominate the
e¤ect through the reduction in the correlation.19 Building on the insight that frictions
reduce the correlation, but can also a¤ect the relative dispersion, I provide an extension
of the Propositions for discrete type distributions in the web appendix.
3 Insurance Markets: Welfare Analysis
We use the established relationship between the demand and value curves to revisit
now standard welfare analysis in insurance markets. The key ine¢ ciency analyzed in
the literature is that individuals sort into insurance plans based on their risks. Firms
18John C. Harsanyi (1968) observed that by the very nature of subjective probabilities, even if two
individuals have exactly the same information and are at exactly the same high level of intelligence,
they may very well assign di¤erent subjective probabilities to the very same events.While rationality
may restrict individuals to be Bayesian, it puts no restrictions on the risk priors, which are primitives
of the model.
19Note that the condition in the Corollary can also be rewritten as v;"    "v , indicating that it
is su¢ cient for the correlation between the noise term and the true value not to take a large negative
value.
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cannot directly price these risks, but set prices to reect average costs instead. Einav,
Finkelstein and Cullen (2010a), henceforth EFC, recently showed that the relative
slope of the cost curve, depicting the average cost of buyers at di¤erent prices, to the
demand curve captures the degree of adverse selection and is su¢ cient to estimate
the corresponding welfare cost in the absence of demand frictions. Demand frictions,
however, cause a di¤erent type of selection ine¢ ciency by inducing some individuals
with low valuation to buy insurance and vice versa. I build on the su¢ cient statistics
approach in EFC and derive a formula to estimate the actual welfare cost of ine¢ cient
selection (based on both risks ánd frictions). The framework provides a robust approach
to assess how demand frictions can a¤ect standard welfare analysis, independent of their
particular structure.
3.1 Stylized Model
The setup of this insurance model closely follows EFC, but is extended with demand
frictions. The model considers a market for a single insurance contract with exoge-
nous characteristics a la Akerlof (1970). This assumption allows me to keep the model
tractable despite the multi-dimensional heterogeneity, but makes it impossible to con-
sider the impact of frictions on contract terms.20
Individuals decide whether or not to buy the uniform insurance contract o¤ered
by risk-neutral insurers. An individual is risk type determines the expected cost to
the insurer, which I denote by i. The true value of insurance vi equals this expected
cost i plus a risk premium ri. The risk premium determines the net-value or surplus
generated when individual i buys insurance from a risk-neutral insurer. It does not
only depend on the individuals (risk) preference, but also on the distribution of the
risk that she is facing. For example, with CARA preferences and normal risks, an
individuals risk premium is determined by her risk aversion and the variance of her
insured expenses. For convenience, I will refer to i as the individuals risk type and
to ri as her preference type.
Like before, the revealed value equals the true value plus the noise term, but the
true value now consists of a risk and preference term,
v^i  vi + "i  i + ri + "i.
The stylized model thus captures three sources of heterogeneity underlying the demand
20The equilibrium characterization of screening contracts for Rotschild-Stiglitz type models with
types only di¤ering in risks has been extended for types also di¤ering in risk aversion (e.g., Jullien
et al. 2007) or risk perceptions (e.g., Sandroni and Squintani 2007, 2013; Spinnewijn 2013). To
keep the analysis tractable, these models consider discrete types, only two dimensions of heterogeneity
and a specic correlation between the two dimensions. These three assumptions are relaxed in the
stylized model I consider. Most recently, Azevedo and Gottlieb (2015) and Veiga and Weyl (2015)
have provided tractable equilibrium characterizations of endogenous contracts in contexts with multi-
dimensional heterogeneity, which could be a promising starting point to start exploring the equilibrium
impact of demand frictions on contract terms.
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for insurance: risk types (determining the insurance cost), preferences (determining
the insurance surplus), and frictions (distorting the insurance demand). The sorting of
individuals based on their risk types determines the cost to the insurers. The average
and marginal cost at price p equal AC (p) = E (jv^  p) and MC (p) = E (jv^ = p)
respectively. The sorting of individuals based on surplus determines welfare. That is,
the welfare impact of extending market coverage depends on the di¤erence between
marginal value MV (p) and marginal cost MC (p) at the market price p.
Graphical representation Figure 2 plots a linear demand curve together with the
corresponding marginal and average cost curves, depicting the average cost for the
marginal and infra-marginal buyers at each price p. If individuals with higher risks
have a higher willingness-to-pay for insurance, the cost to the insurer will be increasing
in the price and the market is adversely selected from a cost perspective. This results
in decreasing cost curves in Figure 2. The average cost curve, which decreases at a
lower rate, lies above the marginal cost curve. The less an individuals risk a¤ects his
or her insurance choice, the less the marginal cost would depend on the price. This
would atten the average and marginal cost curve and reduce the wedge between the
two. With upward-sloping cost curves, the market would be advantageously selected
from a cost perspective.21
3.2 Equilibrium and Welfare
We now characterize the welfare cost of ine¢ cient selection in the equilibrium of this
stylized insurance market. We consider a competitive equilibrium in which the equi-
librium price pc equals the average cost of providing insurance (given that price),22
AC (pc) = pc. (3)
An individual buys insurance when her revealed value exceeds the equilibrium price.
However, it is e¢ cient for an individual to buy insurance if her valuation exceeds the
cost of insurance. When constrained by uniform pricing, the e¢ cient price p is such
that the marginal cost of insurance equals the marginal value of insurance,23
MC (p) = MV (p) . (4)
The price p corresponds to the e¢ cient level of market coverage q.
21 In this case, individuals with higher risk are less likely to buy insurance. Both cost functions are
increasing and the average cost function will be below rather than above the marginal cost function.
22This notion of the competitive equilibrium follows EFC, but the analysis could be naturally ex-
tended with market power (see Mahoney and Weyl, 2014).
23 In the unconstrained e¢ cient allocation an individual buys insurance if and only if r  0. Since
individuals with the same revealed value cannot be separated, the constrained e¢ cient allocation has
individuals with revealed value v^ buying insurance if and only if E (rjv^ = p) = MV (p) MC (p)  0.
I compare uniform pricing with risk-adjusted pricing in section 4.2.
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Comparing the equilibrium condition (3) and the e¢ ciency condition (4) makes
clear how the ine¢ ciency in equilibrium is driven by the wedge between the average
and marginal cost on the one hand and the wedge between the true and revealed value
on the other hand. The total welfare cost due to ine¢ cient pricing in this market
is determined by the di¤erence between the insurance value and cost for the pool of
ine¢ ciently uninsured individuals,
  = j
Z pc
p
[MV (p) MC (p)] dD (p) j.
We now contrast this with the welfare analysis by a Revealed Preference policy
maker. He believes that the ine¢ ciency is completely captured by the wedge between
average and marginal cost with the e¢ cient price pRP given by
MC
 
pRP

= pRP.
Using revealed values, he estimates the welfare cost to be
 RP =
Z pc
pRP
[p MC (p)] dD (p) .
The RP-policy maker (1) misidenties the pool of ine¢ ciently uninsured and (2) mis-
estimates the welfare loss of being ine¢ ciently uninsured,24
  = j RP +
Z pRP
p
[MV (p) MC (p)] dD (p)| {z }
(1)
+
Z pc
pRP
[MV (p)  p] dD (p)| {z }
(2)
j.
Graphical representation The demand and average cost curve intersect at the
equilibrium price pc. The e¢ cient price p is the price for which the the value curve
and the marginal cost curve intersect. The welfare cost   equals the triangular area
between the value curve and the marginal cost curve in between the competitive and
the e¢ cient level of insurance coverage. This is all shown in the right panel of Figure
2. The RP-policy maker mistakenly beliefs that the e¢ cient price pRP is given by
the intersection of the demand and marginal cost curve. The estimated cost  RP
corresponds to the triangle between the demand and marginal cost curve, as shown
in the left panel of Figure 2. Only when the revealed and true values coincide, the
demand and cost curves are indeed su¢ cient to determine the cost of adverse selection,
as shown in EFC.
24Note that  RP is always positive. With adverse selection, pc > pRP and p > MC (p) for the prices
in between. With advantageous selection, pc < pRP and p < MC (p) for the prices in between. This
is not necessarily the case for the integral determining  , which is why I take the absolute value of the
integral.
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Figure 2: Welfare Cost of Ine¢ cient Pricing: The gures contrast the true welfare
cost   (in the right panel) with the estimated welfare cost  RPby a revealed-preference
policy maker (in the left panel) in an adversely selected market with demand frictions
such that cov ("; v^) =cov (r; v^) > 0 and P = px   pRP = pc   pRP > 1:
The wedge between the true welfare cost   and the estimate  RP depends crucially
on whether the revealed values overstate or understate the true values. In an adversely
selected market, the equilibrium price tends to be ine¢ ciently high due to average-
cost pricing. The RP-policy maker underestimates the implied under-insurance if in
addition the uninsured underestimate the value of insurance. This is always the case
if the intersection px exceeds the equilibrium price pc. We can state:
Proposition 3 In an adversely selected market with pc  px and frictions satisfying
MLRP, the true welfare cost   exceeds the estimated welfare cost  RP.
This case is illustrated in Figure 2 and also applies to the empirical analysis in EFC,
which we will revisit below. The actual welfare cost   is higher than  RP, both because
the extent of under-insurance is worse (i.e., p < pRP) and because the demand function
underestimates the value of insurance for the ine¢ ciently uninsured (i.e., p < MV (p)
for all p 2 [p; pc]).
The sign and magnitude of the di¤erence between   and  RP clearly depend on
the wedge between the demand and value curve, and the positioning of the area  RP
relative to the intersection between the demand and value curve. I turn to this issue
next.
3.3 A Su¢ cient Statistics Formula
This section presents a "su¢ cient-statistics" expression of the welfare cost of ine¢ cient
selection, shedding further light on the interaction between the demand and supply
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ine¢ ciencies. The formula also provides a simple approach to evaluate the robustness
of welfare conclusions in the presence of demand frictions.
The derivation of the su¢ cient statistics formula relies on normal heterogene-
ity. As discussed in Section 2.2, the insights are expected to extend to any setting
where conditional expectations are well approximated by the best linear predictor.
Or put di¤erently, to any setting where the covariance ratios cov (; v^) =var (v^) and
cov (v; v^) =var (v^) capture well how cost and value relate to revealed values. In case
of normal heterogeneity, these ratios equal the slopes of the marginal cost curve and
value curve relative to the demand curve.
Corollary 2 With normal heterogeneity, the ratio of the true and estimated welfare
cost equals
 
 RP
= j
[1 +
cov ("; v^)
cov (r; v^)
P]2
1 +
cov ("; v^)
cov (r; v^)
j with P  px   pRP = pc   pRP : (5)
The approximation relies on a linearization of the demand curve through
 
pRP; qRP

and (pc; qc) and the corresponding value and cost curves.25 Since the demand and cost
curves are su¢ cient to estimate  RP, one appeal of this formula is to identify the
additional information that is required to account for frictions.
The actual welfare cost crucially depends on the covariance ratio cov ("; v^) =cov (r; v^).
This ratio captures the extent to which the variation in demand is driven by frictions
rather than by preferences. When all demand components are independent, this equals
the relative share of the residual variation in demand - left unexplained by risks - that
is driven by frictions. Graphically, this friction share determines how the slope of the
value curve relates to the slopes of the demand and marginal cost curve; the value
curve rotates counter-clockwise if cov ("; v^) =cov (r; v^) increases above zero. It initially
coincides with the demand curve (when the residual variation is driven only by pref-
erences) and rotates to a curve parallel to the marginal cost curve (when the residual
variation is driven only by frictions).26
The impact of the covariance ratio cov ("; v^) =cov (r; v^) depends on the price ratio
P = px   pRP = pc   pRP, which captures the positioning of the value curve relative
to the cost curves. This price ratio is illustrated by arrows in Figure 2. The di¤erence
25The derivation in the proof shows clearly how I use the linearization. In particular, the linearization
turns the welfare costs   and  RP into triangular areas, for which I can derive exact expressions. In
the numerical examples in the web appendix, I show that the error due to the linear approximation in
estimating the bias  = RP is small, especially when cov ("; v^) =cov (r; v^) is small:
26Relating this to the earlier decomposition of  , the ratio a¤ects both the misestimation of the
insurance surplus and the misidentication of the pool of ine¢ ciently uninsured;
E ("jv^ = p) = cov ("; v^)
cov (r; v^)
[E (rjv^ = p)  r] and pRP   p =
cov ("; v^)
cov (r + "; v^)
r.
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pc   pRP depends on the nature of selection due to average-cost pricing, while the
di¤erence px pRP determines whether at the price that is deemed to be e¢ cient by an
RP-policy maker, the marginal buyer over- or underestimates the value of insurance.27
To illustrate the joint role of the covariance ratio and the price ratio, consider a
market that is adversely selected from a cost perspective (pc > pRP). When the value
curve intersects with the demand curve at the competitive price (px = pc), the price
ratio P equals 1, implying that the welfare cost   increases (approximately) linearly
with the covariance ratio,
  =  RP  j1 + cov ("; v^)
cov (r; v^)
j.
An RP-policy maker unambiguously underestimates the welfare cost when cov ("; v^) =cov (r; v^) >
0, which is in line with Proposition 3. For larger P >1 (e.g., shifting the value curve
up such that px > pc), the bias in the welfare evaluation becomes larger and increases
at a faster rate when the covariance ratio increases. This is the case illustrated in the
right panel of Figure 2. For smaller P <1 (e.g., shifting the value curve down such
that px < pc), some of the ine¢ ciently uninsured are overestimating rather than un-
derestimating the value of insurance. As a consequence, an RP-policy maker may now
overestimate the welfare cost. For even smaller P <  cov (r; v^) =cov ("; v^), he wrongly
believes that the market equilibrium exhibits under-insurance. The e¢ cient price p
is above the competitive price pc, even though an RP-policy maker perceives it to be
below and thus mistakenly believes that market coverage should be increased.
3.4 Implementing the Formula
I now illustrate the implementation of the su¢ cient statistics formula in a particular
context and demonstrate how the general impact of demand frictions on welfare esti-
mates can be accounted for. I consider the context of employer-provided health plans,
analyzed in EFC, and use their estimates to calculate how the true welfare cost   would
change for di¤erent values of the covariance ratio cov ("; v^) =cov (r; v^). Importantly, this
approach to evaluate the robustness of standard welfare analysis does not require the
data underlying the estimate of  RP (i.e., the demand and cost curves), but allows
to gauge whether demand frictions can matter. I also briey discuss the additional
data that would be required to estimate the relevant friction share in this context and
provide some back-of-the-envelope calculations of plausible values referring to exist-
ing estimates (from di¤erent applications). While more rigorous empirical analysis is
needed to draw rm conclusions, the numerical exercise indicates that in this particular
context the welfare cost of adverse selection is substantially higher when accounting
for the plausible role played by demand frictions.
27With a friction mean E (") = " underlying the demand function, the intersection price p
x equals
v^   "= [cov ("; v^) =var (v^)]. Hence, for zero-mean frictions, the intersection price px equals v^ = v.
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Numerical Example EFC analyze choices of employer-provided health plans.28
They nd this market to be adverse selected, but estimate the welfare cost of the
implied under-insurance to be low (only 3 percent of rst best welfare).29 In their par-
ticular context, more than 50 percent of the individuals are predicted to buy insurance
at the competitive price, suggesting that they would underestimate the welfare cost
under zero-mean frictions.
Table 1 evaluates the robustness of their welfare estimates by showing the true wel-
fare cost of ine¢ cient selection   for di¤erent values of the unknown covariance ratio.
The results indicate that the true welfare cost   increases rapidly with cov ("; v^) =cov ("+ r; v^)
and the di¤erence with the estimated welfare cost  RP is already substantial for seem-
ingly low friction shares; if 1 percent (10 percent) of the residual variation is explained
by frictions, the actual cost of adverse selection is 3 percent (31 percent) higher than
estimated when using the demand function. If half of the residual variation is explained
by frictions, the actual cost of adverse selection is more than 4 times higher than esti-
mated based on the demand function. This corresponds to 25 percent of the surplus
generated in this market at the e¢ cient price.
These results are sensitive to the assumption that frictions drive no average wedge
between the true and revealed value. A negative friction mean further increases the
true value relative to the demand and thus the actual under-insurance in this market.
A positive mean has the opposite e¤ect. In fact, a constant friction " = $137 (
50 percent of the true value for the marginal consumers) would be needed to o¤set
the under-insurance due to average-cost pricing and make the competitive equilibrium
constrained e¢ cient (pc = p). Even with a mean friction value of E (") = $137,
the welfare cost   would again increase above 0 when frictions are heterogeneous and
exceed the estimated cost  RP for cov ("; v^) =cov (r + "; v^)  1=3.
Empirical Implementation The question remains how to obtain plausible values
for the covariance ratio in this context. Recent empirical evidence documents strong
correlates between demand frictions and insurance choices. The role of frictions, how-
ever, varies across contexts and providing a precise estimate of their importance is
challenging. In an ideal setting we would observe the insurance choices (in this envi-
ronment) for the same individuals with and without frictions. This would allow us to
28EFC consider the choice between two insurance contracts and the medical insurance claims of 3,779
salaried employees of Alcoa, a multi-national producer of aluminium. They estimate the (relative)
demand for the contract providing more insurance and the associated cost of providing the additional
insurance to implement their su¢ cient statistics approach.
29 I assume a linear system in this numerical example to make the welfare results comparable to
the EFC estimates for linear demand and cost curves. This assumes that the relative slopes of the
linear curves take the values of the covariance ratios as in the case of normal heterogeneity. Note
also that for such linear system the welfare cost approximation in (5) would be exact. For robustness
purposes, I also relax this linearity assumption and calculate the welfare costs when assuming that the
di¤erent demand components are normally distributed, now assuming that the estimated relative slopes
determine the covariance ratios. Table App1 in the web appendix shows that the welfare implications
are very similar.
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estimate the joint distribution of the willingness-to-pay v^ (distorted by frictions) and
the true value v across the population. For example, one could compare individuals
choices before and after an information workshop or the introduction of choice aids.
If such interventions were to fully eliminate demand frictions, this type of data would
be su¢ cient to construct the value curve and estimate the share of demand variation
explained by frictions.30
A promising approach, coming close to this ideal setting, is to identify friction
measures a¤ecting the insurance choice, but unrelated to the insurance value. This ap-
proach has been followed most recently by Handel and Kolstad (2015) who complement
standard insurance data with survey questions to estimate the impact of frictions on
the willingness-to-pay for insurance in a random utility model. These friction estimates
allow to construct a friction value "i for each individual and to recover the individuals
true insurance value vi from the estimated willingness-to-pay v^i.31
Even without additional choice data, we can rely on existing empirical estimates to
get an indication of what friction shares are plausible and predict the corresponding
impact of demand frictions. Consider again the empirical analysis in EFC. They nd
that the slope of the marginal cost curve is one third of the demand curve, implying
an estimate for cov (; v^) =var (v^) of 1=3. This leaves about two third of the variation
in demand to be explained by frictions or preferences, since
cov (; v^)
var (v^)
+
cov (r; v^)
var (v^)
+
cov ("; v^)
var (v^)
= 1.
Example 3 in Section 2 provides a direct lower bound on cov ("; v^) =var (v^) as this
ratio would correspond to the share of boundedly rational individuals. While the
stylized representation of individuals simply mimicking their peers in this example
is quite extreme, Loewenstein et al. (2013) nd that between 22 and 66 percent of
surveyed individuals do not even understand basic plan features like deductibles and
coinsurance. Now if 1=6 of individuals were mimicking the insurance choice of a ran-
dom peer in the EFC setting (with cov (; v^) =var (v^) = 1=3), the covariance ratio
cov ("; v^) =cov (r + "; v^) would be at least :25.
Example 1 in Section 2 suggests that when individualsperceptions do not accu-
rately reect their true risks, this would drive down cov (;  + ") =var ( + "). The
relation between true and perceived risks has been analyzed in many settings. For ex-
ample, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) nd estimates of around 0:1 when estimating
a linear probability model of nursing home use using the self-reported beliefs of this
probability.32 If the expected insurance cost  were linear in this probability, this low
30Note that it is not su¢ cient to have choice data respectively with and without frictions for otherwise
comparable groups if the correlation between true value and frictions is unknown. Chetty et al. (2009)
uses such data in the context of tax salience, but their welfare analysis relies on the assumption that
the inattention is the same for all consumers.
31See Harris and Keane (1999) and Fang et al. (2008) for alternative examples.
32Notice that Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) nd a positive relationship between the self-reported
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value would be the estimate of cov (;  + ") =var ( + ").33 However, even allowing
for values up to :5 in the EFC context (with cov (; v^) =var (v^) = 1=3), a back-of-the-
envelope calculation indicates that the covariance ratio cov ("; v^) =cov ("+ r; v^) would
still exceed :5.34
4 Insurance Markets: Policy Interventions
In this section I use the framework with demand frictions to analyze di¤erent policy
interventions that are currently in place in insurance markets. I provide some policy
results that clearly demonstrate how the impact of these interventions is a¤ected by
demand frictions and identify potentially opposing forces. I illustrate these qualitative
di¤erences using some numerical examples that build on the empirical analysis in EFC.
I rst compare price subsidies and insurance mandates, two commonly used poli-
cies that do not change the sorting of individuals along the demand curve. Hence, the
covariance ratio cov ("; v^) =cov (r; v^) remains su¢ cient to evaluate welfare gains (con-
ditional on the observed demand and cost functions). I also analyze risk-rating and
friction-reducing policies. These policies a¤ect individualswillingness to insure dif-
ferentially and thus change the sorting of individuals along the demand curve. Here,
correlations between the di¤erent demand components would be needed to predict the
consequences of these policies.
4.1 Subsidy vs. Mandate
The question whether insurance should be subsidized or mandated plays a central role
in the policy debate in various countries.35 The main di¤erence between the two policies
is that price subsidies leave the choice to buy insurance to individuals. Demand fric-
tions determine how big the price incentives need to be to change individualschoices,
but only the true value of insurance determines the welfare impact of these changes.
Encouraging the purchase of insurance through a price policy is less e¤ective the lower
the revealed value relative to the true value. In contrast, a mandate forces an individual
probability and insurance coverage, but no signicant relationship between the true risk and insurance
coverage, consistent with the role played by demand frictions.
33Surveyed risk perceptions are found to predict risk realizations, often better than any other set of
covariates, but the estimated relation is generally very small (see Hurd (2009) for a recent overview).
Clearly, the self-reported probability does not measure the demand-driving perceived probability with-
out error and measurement error attenuates the estimate of cov (;  + ") =var ( + ") towards 0.
34Here, I use the following decomposition,
cov ("; v^)
var (v^)
=
cov ( + "; v^)
var (v^)
  cov (; v^)
var (v^)
=
"
1
cov(;+")
var(+")
  1
#
 cov (; v^)
var (v^)
, (6)
where the approximation relies on the correlation of the surplus with either risk or frictions to be small.
35A recent example is the much debated health insurance mandate as part of the A¤ordable Care
Act in the United States.
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to buy insurance, regardless of the demand frictions. I illustrate this contrast in our
stylized insurance model with demand frictions.
I consider an e¢ cient-price subsidy and a universal mandate, following EFC, and
continue to assume that only the true value is relevant to evaluate the policy. An
e¢ cient-price subsidy reduces the equilibrium price to the e¢ cient price p. This sub-
sidy induces the original pool of ine¢ ciently uninsured to buy insurance and thus
realizes the welfare gain  . The welfare cost of this subsidy equals S = q [pc   p],
which depends on the implied expenditures and the net cost of public funds .36 By
forcing everyone to buy insurance, a universal mandate realizes the same welfare gain
 , but entails a di¤erent welfare cost M =
R p
0 [MC (p) MV (p)] dD (p). For in-
dividuals with revealed value v^ below the e¢ cient price p, the expected surplus of
insurance is negative.
The following policy result illustrates the di¤erential welfare impact of the two
policy interventions when frictions underly the observed demand and cost curves, .
Policy Result 1 For given demand and cost functions, demand frictions satisfying
MLRP and E (") = 0 increase the net welfare gain from a universal mandate,   M ,
but may decrease this for an e¢ cient-price subsidy,   S. A mandate becomes more
desirable relative to an e¢ cient price-subsidy when frictions lower the e¢ cient price
p.
As already argued in Proposition 1, frictions tend to increase the expected insurance
surplus for the uninsured and thus the welfare gain   M from a universal mandate.
Although the gain   from an e¢ cient-price subsidy is the same, the impact on the net
gain     S is ambiguous. The di¤erential impact of frictions on the two policies is
particularly clear when frictions increase the e¢ cient level of market coverage q (and
thus decreases the e¢ cient price p), as is the case in the numerical example. While
the group of the e¢ ciently uninsured becomes smaller, the group of the ine¢ ciently
uninsured becomes larger. The former causes the cost of the mandate M to decrease,
while the latter causes the cost of an e¢ cient price subsidy S to increase. The opposite
e¤ects naturally imply that a universal mandate becomes more desirable relative to an
e¢ cient-price subsidy. Moreover, if the increase in the cost S exceeds the increase in
the gain  , frictions would in fact reduce the net gain from an e¢ cient-price subsidy.
Note that it is the discrepancy between the true and revealed values that is driving
these opposite e¤ects. Frictions a¤ect the gain from extending coverage by changing
the surplus for the marginal buyers, but the cost of extending the market coverage
through a subsidy continues to depend on the price these marginal buyers are willing
to pay.37
36Note that the cost of a price subsidy makes that the subsidy that induces the e¢ cient price is not
welfare optimal. In particular, the welfare gain for the marginal buyers at the e¢ cient price is zero
and thus exceeded by the marginal cost of the subsidy required to induce them to buy insurance.
37Note also that the implementation of an e¢ cient-price subsidy would require knowledge of the
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Numerical Example I briey build on the previous example to illustrate the di¤er-
ential impact of frictions on mandates and subsidies quantitatively. Setting the cost of
public funds  equal to 0:3, EFC nd that the welfare cost of the e¢ cient price subsidy
S is almost ve times as large as the welfare gain   and thus implies a welfare loss
from using this policy. The gain   from inducing e¢ cient insurance coverage increases
when frictions are underlying the estimated demand curve, but the subsidys cost S
increases even more, as shown in column (1) of Table 2.38 The net loss of a price
subsidy is thus larger in the presence of frictions. The opposite is true for the mandate.
The estimates of EFC imply that a universal mandate would be welfare decreasing in
the absence of frictions. This loss, however, decreases when frictions are underlying the
demand, as reported in column (2). In fact, when more than 17 percent of the vari-
ation in residual demand, left unexplained by risks, is driven by frictions, a universal
mandate becomes welfare increasing. Frictions can thus reverse the net impact of a
government intervention on welfare and the decision to implement it or not.
4.2 Risk-Rating
An alternative intervention in insurance markets related to adverse selection is the
regulation of risk-rating or pricing based on pre-existing conditions. While risk-rating
is often being rejected on equity grounds (e.g., the ban on gender discrimination in
insurance pricing by the European Court of Justice), earlier work has emphasized the
e¢ ciency aspect of adjusting premia to reect an individuals specifc risk (e.g., Bundorf,
Levin and Mahoney 2012). Underlying the problem of adverse selection is the fact that
buyers of insurance plans do not internalize the individual-specic cost they impose
on their insurer. Adjusting prices for their individual-specic risk corrects this type of
externality and induces a more e¢ cient decision. However, the e¢ ciency gain crucially
depends on these risks being perceived accurately or not being neutralized by other
demand frictions. I use our stylized model to illustrate how risk-rating can entail
e¢ ciency losses due to the presence of demand frictions.
I consider a risk-adjusted insurance premium p+ (i), where the adjustment  (i)
is weakly increasing in the individuals risk type i and equal to 0 if i = . Perfect
risk-rating would be obtained when  (i) = i   . We can re-express the value and
cost of providing insurance net of the risk-adjustment and apply the equilibrium and
welfare analysis as before. That is, an individual buys insurance if and only if v^i  p,
heterogeneity driving the demand for insurance. For example, an RP-policy maker would implement
a subsidy equal to pc   pRP that is too small. An additional advantage of the universal mandate is
therefore that the implementation requires no prior knowledge.
38 I again use a linear system in this numerical example, following EFC, but nd that the policy
implications are similar when the di¤erent demand components are normally distributed (see Table
App2).
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where v^i = v^i  (i). The cost for the insurer, net of the risk-adjustment, now equals
AC (p) = E

    () jv^  p

,
MC (p) = E

    () jv^ = p

.
As argued in previous work, risk-rating will lower the equilibrium price and thus
increase equilibrium coverage, Pr
 
v^  pc. Pricing risks mechanically reduces di¤er-
ence between the unpriced risk among the insured and the uninsured. Moreover, it
makes high risk types less likely to buy insurance and low risk types more likely to buy
insurance. Both e¤ects lower the average cost curve and thus the competitive price.
Equilibrium welfare Sc = E
 
rjv^  pcPr  v^  pc, however, also depends on
the type of individuals buying insurance at the competitive price.39 The surplus
E
 
rjv^  p for a given price p is higher the more preferences rather than any other
variable drive the demand for insurance. Without frictions, reducing the selection based
on risks necessarily increases the selection based on preferences. The issue is that when
demand frictions distort the relation between risk and insurance demand, adjusting the
prices for an individuals risk may have a very di¤erent impact on the selection into
insurance depending on the correlation between risk and frictions. In fact, the selection
on preferences can even decrease when this correlation is strongly negative. This is the
case when people di¤er in their risks, but underestimate these di¤erences.40
I consider two extreme cases to illustrate these opposing e¤ects on the equilibrium
surplus:
Policy Result 2 Without frictions "i = 0, perfect risk-rating unambiguously increases
equilibrium welfare Sc. With frictions "i =    i and corr (; r) = 0, perfect risk-
rating unambiguously decreases equilibrium welfare.
Perfect risk-rating corrects the externality an individual imposes on the insurer. In
the absence of frictions, this induces an individual to buy insurance if and only the
net-value ri is positive, which is exactly e¢ cient. Frictions make that an individual
does not accurately internalize the value of buying insurance for herself either. For
"i =    i, the friction already o¤sets the externality such that the introduction of
risk-rating creates the ine¢ ciency that it is supposed to eliminate. This extreme case
arises when all individuals perceive their risk to be exactly equal to the average risk.
The policy result again indicates that by ignoring frictions a policy maker would
misperceive the e¢ ciency gains from policy. The bias, however, does not simply de-
39Notice that I continue to ignore equity considerations by using the equilibrium surplus as the
welfare criterion. Clearly, risk-rating makes insurance more expensive for high risk-types, which may
be undesirable for redistributive reasons, but this is not captured when considering the aggregate
equilibrium surplus.
40When the preference term is independently distributed, risk-rating increases the surplus at a given
equilibrium price only if var ( + ")  var ( + "   ()). For perfect risk-rating, this simplies to
";    12 " .
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pend on the di¤erence between the demand and value curve. More generally, since
risk-rating changes the ordering of individuals along the demand curve, the original
demand, cost and value curves are no longer su¢ cient to evaluate the impact of such
policy intervention. Instead we would need information on the correlations between
the di¤erent demand components.
Numerical Example I extend the numerical example based on the analysis in EFC
to now illustrate the potential role of frictions for the welfare impact of risk-rating. I
consider three di¤erent assumptions on the correlation between frictions and the other
demand components, which I use to calibrate the covariance matrix of (; r; ").41 I
consider a linear risk-adjustment of the insurance premium  () =  [   ] and
simulate the new demand, cost and value curves and the corresponding equilibrium for
di¤erent values of . Table 3 shows how risk-rating a¤ects equilibrium welfare Sc and
the cost of ine¢ cient selection   for the di¤erent cases.
The rst two columns (0a) and (0b) in Table 3 show the positive welfare impact of
risk-rating in the absence of frictions. Equilibrium welfare increases by up to 11 percent
when the risk-adjustment is perfect,  = 1. The reduction in   due to the elimination
of the ine¢ cient wedge between pc and p accounts for about one third of the welfare
increase. Note that these welfare estimates are very similar to the estimates in Bundorf
et al. (2012), analyzing employees choices between HMO plans and PPO plans.42
The remaining columns of Table 3 show how di¤erent the welfare conclusions are
in the presence of frictions. I assume an initial value of 0:25 for cov ("; v^) =cov ("+ r; v^)
(in the absence of risk-rating), but allow for di¤erent correlations ;" between risk and
frictions. In the rst scenario, all components are independent and the welfare impact
of risk-rating is hardly a¤ected (see columns (1a) and (1b)). In the second scenario,
the noise term is negatively correlated with the risk such that var () = var ( + ").
One interpretation is that the dispersion in true and perceived risks is the same, but
the correlation between the two is imperfect. Risk-rating still increases welfare, but
the increase is reduced to 7 percent for  = 1, as shown in column (2a). The third
scenario increases the magnitude of the negative correlation "; further such that
var ( + ") = 0:5var (). Following the above interpretation, this assumes that the
perceived risks are not only imperfectly correlated with the true risks, but also less
dispersed. This last scenario, shown in column (3a), illustrates that frictions may not
only reduce but even reverse the positive welfare e¤ect of risk-rating. The introduction
41 I still assume that all curves are linear with their slopes depending on the covariance matrix of
(; r; "), but establish robustness for normal heterogeneity in Table App3. I assume an initial value of
:33 for cov (; v^) =var (v^) corresponding to the relative slope of the average cost curve in EFC and of
:25 for the covariance ratio cov ("; v^) =cov ("+ r; v^) capturing the relative importance of frictions.
42Bundorf et al. (2012) allow for private information about risks over the observed risk scores, but
assume accurate risk perceptions. They nd a potential welfare increase of 2-11 percent from pricing
the observable risk, where about one fourth is due to eliminating the wedge between the equilibrium
and e¢ cient price.
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of risk-rating initially o¤sets adverse selection and increases welfare by decreasing the
equilibrium price. However, the selection of insured individuals becomes more and more
dependent on their risk types when increasing the risk-adjustment factor . This e¤ect
decreases the generated surplus at a given price and eventually dominates the welfare
gain from the reduced equilibrium price. Perfect risk-rating now reduces welfare by 3
percent.
4.3 Reducing Frictions
When choices are distorted by the presence of frictions or constraints, a natural gov-
ernment intervention is to alleviate these constraints. For example, the provision of
information can reduce information frictions and help individuals to improve the quality
of their choices, as illustrated in the context of Medicare Part D by Kling et al. (2012).
The setup of Health Insurance Exchanges in the US is another recent policy meant to
improve insurance choices by regulating the types of insurance plans that can be of-
fered, how information about them is presented to consumers, the defaults individuals
face, etc. The issue with these interventions is that the pool of insured individuals and
thus the equilibrium price is a¤ected as well. While reducing frictions induces people
to make better decisions, it may decrease welfare by increasing adverse selection. I use
the stylized framework to disentangle the two opposing e¤ects on welfare.
Consider two friction-reducing policies decreasing the variance of zero-mean fric-
tions. The rst policy, by reducing ", increases the correlation between  and  + ".
The second policy, by reducing ", increases the correlation between r and r + ". A
natural interpretation in case of inaccurate risk perceptions is that the rst policy pro-
vides information about the average expenses one expects to make, while the second
policy provides information about the variance in these expenses. Graphically, the rst
policy entails a clockwise rotation of both the marginal cost curve and the value curve,
while the second policy only rotates the value curve. For both policies, the demand
curve remains unchanged.
The rst policy makes an individuals demand more aligned with her risk type;
individuals with high  become more likely to buy insurance, individuals with low 
become less likely to buy insurance. The average expected cost of the individuals buy-
ing insurance at a given price level increases, which increases the equilibrium price as
the demand function is una¤ected. However, the expected net-value of the individ-
uals buying insurance at a given price is still the same. Hence, the same surplus is
generated for those buying insurance, but less individuals buy insurance so that the
competitive surplus is unambiguously lower if the market equilibrium already exhibits
under-insurance. The second policy makes an individuals demand more aligned with
her preference and has the opposite e¤ect. The policy induces people with a high net-
value r to buy insurance, but the competitive price remains unchanged as the expected
cost of the individuals buying insurance is not a¤ected. Hence, as many people buy
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insurance in equilibrium, but a higher welfare surplus is generated for those buying
insurance. The competitive surplus thus unambiguously increases.
Policy Result 3 Assuming normal heterogeneity, a friction-reducing policy that in-
creases the correlation between r and r+" unambiguously increases equilibrium welfare
Sc. A friction-reducing policy that increases the correlation between  and +" reduces
welfare when the equilibrium exhibits under-insurance (i.e., pc > p).
For information policies, the potential trade-o¤ between improving the selection
on preferences vs. risks could be avoided by providing the right type of information.
Information regarding the cost-related value of insurance will be detrimental, as it only
a¤ects the market price, while information regarding the net-value of insurance will
be benecial, as it only a¤ects the selection of the individuals buying insurance. The
trade-o¤ is similar when other constraints drive a wedge between the revealed and
true value, but identifying policies that leave the equilibrium price una¤ected may be
more di¢ cult. For example, when switching costs prevent individuals from buying
a new insurance contract, as considered by Handel (2013), a policy that reduces the
switching costs will be welfare decreasing when the individuals facing higher switching
costs face higher risks.
Numerical Example I use the same numerical example to now illustrate the po-
tential opposing welfare e¤ects from reducing frictions. Since friction-reducing policies
a¤ect the sorting into insurance, I again consider di¤erent scenarios for the correlation
between frictions and the other demand components, starting from an initial value of
0:25 for cov ("; v^) =cov ("+ r; v^). Table 4 shows for each scenario how a reduction in
the variance of the noise term 2" a¤ects welfare S
c and the cost of ine¢ cient selection
  in the new equilibrium.
The rst scenario assumes that the three demand components ; r and " are in-
dependent. A reduction in " increases the selection on both risks and preferences.
While in theory the net impact is ambiguous, column (1a) in Table 4 shows that re-
ducing frictions increases welfare in this example, up to 4 percent when all frictions are
eliminated. The cost of ine¢ cient selection   - which is now only due to average-cost
pricing - is lower as well. The second and third scenario disentangle the importance
of the two opposing e¤ects. The second scenario assumes that the reduction in "
only increases the correlation between  and  + ", as for the rst policy in Result
3. This scenario also corresponds to the second scenario considered in Table 3. The
policy induces the more costly types to buy insurance and thus worsens the adverse
selection. Welfare is lower in the new equilibrium and the cost of adverse selection
has increased. With all frictions eliminated, welfare decreases by 3 percent, while the
cost of ine¢ cient selection   has now increased. Finally, the third scenario assumes
that a reduction in " only increases the correlation between r and r + ", as for the
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second policy in Result 3. The information policy improves the selection of individuals,
without a¤ecting the equilibrium price, so that welfare unambiguously increases. With
all frictions eliminated, welfare increases by 12 percent. This is three times as high as
in the rst scenario with independent noise. The welfare consequence of eliminating
frictions in this example crucially depends on their relation with risks and preferences.
5 Conclusion
What explains the variation in demand for insurance? This di¢ cult question has
been central in a recent, but already prominent empirical literature. A number of
recent studies suggest that what drives insurance choices is often unrelated to the
actual value of insurance. Nevertheless, the literature analyzing the importance of
adverse selection in insurance markets has evaluated potential government interventions
under the assumption that individuals choices reveal the actual value of insurance.
This paper provides a tractable framework to analyze welfare and policies when the
true and revealed value of insurance no longer coincide. The analysis uses a simple
selection argument to show that the welfare conclusions based on the insurance demand
are systematically biased, even without an average bias in the valuation of insurance.
This approach complements the choice-based behavioral welfare analysis proposed by
Bernheim and Rangel (2009). An individuals insurance choice may be suboptimal when
induced by a friction or constraint that is not considered relevant for welfare. When
these constraints a¤ect individuals di¤erently, but cannot be individually identied, no
allocation could be found to be welfare-dominated for a particular individual based on
her observed choice. However, choices may still be indicative of the constraints that
have a¤ected individuals making this choice. This selection e¤ect could be accounted
for when evaluating the expected value of a policy for individuals who made a particular
choice. A numerical example illustrates that for plausible di¤erences between the true
and revealed value of insurance, the welfare conclusions regarding the e¢ ciency cost of
adverse selection are substantially di¤erent. The analysis also reveals that the welfare
gains of the common policy interventions in insurance markets crucially depend on
the source of the heterogeneity underlying the demand for insurance. Further research
should shed more light on these sources of heterogeneity in di¤erent insurance markets
to guide the optimal design of policy interventions.
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Tables
Table 1: Cost of adverse selection Depending on Frictions.
Cov. Ratio Cost of Adverse Selection
cov ("; v^)
cov ("+ r; v^)
 
(1)
 =S
(2)
 = RP
(3)
0 9:5 0:04 1
0:01 9:8 0:04 1:03
0:10 12:4 0:06 1:31
0:25 18:6 0:10 1:95
0:50 38:4 0:25 4:03
1 96:6 0:62 10:1
Column (1) shows the cost of adverse selection   expressed in $ / indiv in the market analyzed
in Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010a). Note that the actual e¢ cient allocation is bounded
by complete market coverage (i.e., q  1). Column (2) expresses this cost relative to the
surplus S = E(rjv^  p) Pr (v^  p) when the price is (constrained) e¢ cient p = p. Col-
umn (3) expresses this cost relative to the estimated cost when ignoring frictions,  RP. The
rst row corresponds to the original welfare estimates in EFC, assuming absence of frictions.
The covariance ratio cov("; v^)=cov("+ r; v^) captures the importance of frictions relative to
preferences in explaining the residual demand variation.
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Table 2: The welfare gain of subsidies and mandates.
Cov. Ratio Government Interventions
cov ("; v^)
cov ("+ r; v^)
Price Subsidy
   S
(1)
Universal Mandate
   M
(2)
0  35:4  19:8
:01  35:7  18:6
:10  37:2  8:1
:25  41:1 9:3
:50  125:7 38:4
1  67:2 96:6
Column (1) shows the net welfare gain from the e¢ cient-price subsidy closing the gap between
the equilibrium price pc and the e¢ cient price p, with S = q[pc p], again in the
market analyzed by Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010a). The e¢ cient allocation and thus
the e¢ cient price are bounded by complete market coverage (i.e., q  1). Column (2) shows
the net welfare gain from a universal mandate obliging all individuals to buy insurance, where
M denotes the welfare loss from mandating individuals with expected valuation below the
expected marginal cost to buy insurance. The rst row corresponds to the original welfare
estimates in EFC, assuming absence of frictions. The covariance ratio cov("; v^)=cov("+ r; v^)
captures the importance of frictions relative to preferences in explaining the residual demand
variation.
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Table 3: The Welfare Impact of Risk-Rating.
Risk No Noise Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Adj. Independ: var (+") = var () var (+") = 12var ()

Sc=Sc
(0a)
 
(0b)
Sc=Sc
(1a)
 
(1b)
Sc=Sc
(2a)
 
(2b)
Sc=Sc
(3a)
 
(3b)
0 0 9:5 0 18:6 0 18:6 0 18:6
:10 :02 6:8 :02 15:0 :02 14:5 :03 13:2
:25 :05 3:6 :05 10:5 :05 9:9 :05 8:5
:50 :08 :8 :09 5:4 :08 5:7 :06 6:8
:75 :10 :1 :11 2:9 :08 4:7 :02 10:6
1 :11 0 :11 2:2 :07 6:4  :03 19:8
Columns (0a),(1a),(2a) and (3a) show the change in equilibrium welfare Sc = E(rjv^ 
pc) Pr(v^  pc) for positive linear shares of the risk-premium adjustment () = [   ]
(relative to the case with no risk-adjustment,  = 0). Columns (0b), (1b), (2b) and (3b) show
the welfare cost in the new equilibrium due to the adverse selection  . Scenario 1 assumes
independence between r;  and ". Scenario 2 assumes var(+ ") = var(). Scenario 3 assumes
var(+") = 12var(). The three scenarios start from an initial value for cov("; v^)=cov("+ r; v^)
equal to :25. Notice that equilibrium welfare equals Sc = $243 given this initial value, while it
equals Sc = $272 without frictions.
The demand curve is taken from EFC with linear slope p0 (q) =  1=0:0007 and remains un-
changed in the calibrations. The value and marginal cost curve are assumed to be linear with
slope cov(;v^)var(v^) p
0 (q) and cov(+r;v^)var(v^) p
0 (q) respectively and intersect with the estimated demand and
marginal cost curve at q = :5 . I set the standard deviation v^ equal to 571:43 = 12:50:0007
based on the estimated slope of the demand curve. That is, for a normal demand curve with
cdf , the slope equals p0 (q) = v^ 

 1
0
(1  q) and I nd  1(1 q)(1 q) =  2:5 when tak-
ing the estimated revealed values for q = 0:5 and q = 0:7, in between which all observations
in EFC are. The estimated slope of the marginal cost curve determines the initial value of
cov(; v^), while the initial values of cov(r; v^) and cov("; v^) are determined by the initial value
for the covariance ratio. To calibrate the remaining parts of the covariance matrix, I assume
;" = r;" = r; = 0 under scenario 1. Under scenario 2, I continue to assume r;" = r; = 0,
but ;" =   12 " such that var ( + ") = var (). In scenario 3, this negative correlation is
further increased such that var ( + ") = 12var (). Table App3 in the web appendix shows the
equilibrium welfare and cost of adverse selection when the demand components are normally
distributed. The results are similar.
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Table 4: The Welfare Impact of Information Policies.
Noise Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Reduction Independence corr (;  + ")% corr (r; r + ")%
2"=
2
"
Sc=Sc
(1a)
 
(1b)
Sc=Sc
(2a)
 
(2b)
Sc=Sc
(3a)
 
(3b)
0 0 18:6 0 18:6 0 18:6
:10 :00 18:1  :00 19:2 :01 17:4
:25 :01 17:5  :01 20:3 :03 15:7
:50 :02 16:4  :01 22:2 :06 13:3
1 :04 14:2  :03 26:5 :12 9:5
Columns (1a),(2a) and (3a) show the change in equilibrium welfare Sc = E(rjv^  pc) Pr(v^  pc)
when reducing the variance in noise under the three respective scenarios (relative to the case
with no noise reduction). Columns (1b),(2b) and (3b) show the welfare cost due to the adverse
selection   in the new equilibrium. Scenario 1 assumes independence between r;  and ".
Scenario 2 assumes that var(+") = var(), which implies that the correlation between  and
 + " increases as " decreases. Scenario 3 assumes var(r + ") = var(r), which implies that
the correlation between r and r + " increases as " decreases. The three scenarios start from
an initial value for cov("; v^)=cov(" + r; v^) equal to :25. Notice that equilibrium welfare equals
Sc = $243 given this initial value.
The calibration of the demand and cost curves is similar as for the information polices (see Table
3). To recalibrate the three covariances when " decreases, I assume ;" = r;" = r; = 0
under scenario 1. Under scenario 2, I continue to assume r;" = r; = 0, but ;" =   12 " .
This ensures that var ( + ") remains unchanged and only the correlation between  and + "
increases when reducing ". Under scenario 3, I assume ;" = r; = 0, but r;" =   12 "r .
Table App4 in the web appendix shows the equilibrium welfare and cost of adverse selection
when the demand components are normally distributed. The results are again similar.
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Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote the density functions of v^; v and " by f; h and g respectively. Since by
Bayeslaw g("jv^) = f(v^j")g(")f(v^) , we can rewrite
g ("jv^  p) =
R1
p g ("jv^) dv^R1
p f (v^) dv^
=
R1
p f (v^j") g (") dv^R1
p f (v^) dv^
=
Pr (v^  pj")
Pr (v^  p) g (") ,
with
R Pr(v^pj")
Pr(v^p) g (") = 1. Since v and " are independent, Pr (v^  pj") =
R1
p " h (v) dv is
increasing in ". Hence, the conditional distribution of "jv^  p rst-order stochastically
dominates the unconditional distribution of " and thus
E ("jv^  p) =
Z
"g (")
Pr (v^  pj")
Pr (v^  p) d" 
Z
"g (") d" = E (") = 0.
Similarly, we nd
E ("jv^  p) =
Z
"g (")
Pr (v^  pj")
Pr (v^  p) d" 
Z
"g (") d" = E (") = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
This is an immediate application of Proposition 1 in Milgrom (1981). That is,Z
"g ("jv^1) d" 
Z
"g ("jv^2) d" for any v^1  v^2
i¤
f (v^1j"1)
f (v^1j"2) 
f (v^2j"1)
f (v^2j"2) for any "1  "2.
Hence, the expected value of ", conditional on v^, is increasing in v^.
Proof of Proposition 3
In an adversely selected market, the average cost AC (p) exceeds the marginal cost
MC (p) and MC 0 (p) > AC 0 (p) > 0. With the demand curve steeper than the cost
curves (AC 0 (p) < MC 0 (p) < 1), the price pc at which demand curve and average cost
curve intersect (i.e., pc = AC (pc)) exceeds the price pRP at which demand curve and
marginal cost curves intersect (i.e., pRP = MC
 
pRP

). MLRP implies that the value
curve is a counter-clockwise rotation of the demand curve (i.e.,MV 0 (p) < 1). Since the
price px at which the value curve and the demand curve intersect (i.e., px = MV (px))
32
exceeds pc, the constrained-e¢ cient price p at which the value curve intersects with the
marginal cost curve (i.e., MV (p) = MC (p)) will be lower than pRP forMV 0 (p)  0.
(In the special case with MV 0 (p)  0 and MV (p) > MC (p) for all p < pc or with
MV 0 (p) < 0 and E (v   c)  0, it will be e¢ cient for all individuals to buy insurance
and again p  pRP.) Hence, we have established that px  pc  pRP  p.
Combining this with MV (p) > p for all p < px and MV (p) > MC (p) for all
p  p, we nd Z pc
pRP
[MV (p)  p] dD (p)  0,Z pRP
p
[MV (p) MC (p)] dD (p)  0,
and thus     RP.
A.2 Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 1
By normality,
E ("jv^  p) = E (v^jv^  p)  E (vjv^  p)
= v^ + v^


p v^
v^

1  

p v^
v^
   v   v 

p v^
v^

1  

p v^
v^

= [v^   v]


p v^
v^

1  

p v^
v^
 .
Hence, E ("jv^  p)  0 i¤ v^  v. Similarly, we nd E ("jv^  p)  0 i¤ v^  v.
By normality,
E ("jv^ = p) = " +
cov ("; v^)
var (v^)
[p  v^] .
Since
cov ("; v^)
var (v^)
=
cov (v^; v^)
var (v^)
  cov (v; v^)
var (v^)
= 1  v
v^
Hence, E ("jv^ = p) is increasing in p if and only if vv^ < 1.
Proof of Corollary 2
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An RP-policy maker estimates the cost of adverse selection as
 RP =
Z pc
pRP
[p MC (p)] dD (p)
=
Z pc
pRP

p  cov (; v^)
var (v^)
[p  v^]  

dD (p)
=
Z pc
pRP

1  cov (; v^)
var (v^)

p  pRP dD (p) ,
where p = MC (p) evaluated at p = pRP. Notice that  RP is always positive, since
p MC (p) for p 2 pRP; pc if pRP  pc and p MC (p) for p 2 pc; pRP if pRP  pc.
Linearizing the demand function, (i.e., assuming that the density at each price level is
the same and equal to f), this is approximately equal to
 RP =

1  cov (; v^)
var (v^)

pc   pRP2 f
2
=
cov (r + "; v^)
var (v^)

pc   pRP2 f
2
.
A similar argument allows to approximate the true cost of adverse selection,
  = j
Z pc
p
[MV (p) MC (p)] dD (p) j
= j
Z pc
p

cov ( + r; v^)
var (v^)
[p  v^] + v^  
cov (; v^)
var (v^)
[p  v^]  

dD (p) j
= j
Z pc
p
cov (r; v^)
var (v^)
[p  p] dD (p) j
= jcov (r; v^)
var (v^)
[pc   p]2
f
2
j:
I take absolute values such that the formula also applies if p > pc. Hence, the ratio
equals
 
 RP
= j cov (r; v^)
cov (r + "; v^)
[pc   p]2
[pc   pRP]2 j
= j cov (r; v^)
cov (r + "; v^)

1 +
pRP   p
pc   pRP
2
j.
Now we still want to substitute for the unobservable p. By normality, we nd that
p MC (p) = cov (r + "; v^)
var (v^)

p  pRP ,
MV (p) MC (p) = cov (r; v^)
var (v^)
[p  p] ,
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since respectively pRP = MC
 
pRP

and MV (p) = MC (p). Moreover, at p = v^,
p = MV (p) and thus v^  MC (v^) = MV (v^) MC (v^) :Hence,
cov (r + "; v^)
var (v^)

v^   pRP

=
cov (r; v^)
var (v^)
[v^   p] .
Rearranging, we nd

pRP   p = cov ("; v^)
cov (r; v^)

v^   pRP

.
Substituting this in the expression for  = RP, we nd
 
 RP
= j cov (r; v^)
cov (r + "; v^)

1 +
cov ("; v^)
cov (r; v^)
v^   pRP
pc   pRP
2
j
= j
h
1 + cov(";v^)cov(r;v^)
v^ pRP
pc pRP
i2
1 + cov(";v^)cov(r;v^)
j.
The expression in the Proposition immediately follows.
A.3 Policy Results
Proof of Policy Result 1
When MLRP is satised and E (") = 0, frictions induce a counter-clockwise rotation
of the value curve. If the demand and cost functions remain unchanged, the equilibrium
price remains the same and the rotation unambiguously increases the insurance value for
the uninsured E (vjv^  pc). This immediately follows from condition (2) in combination
with E (") = 0. If the cost functions remain unchanged, the cost of providing insurance
to the uninsured E (jv^  pc) remains unchanged as well. Hence, the net gain from
mandating the uninsured to buy insurance unambiguously increases.
If the counter-clockwise rotation decreases the e¢ cient price p, the cost of the
e¢ cient-price subsidy S = q [pc   p] increases. However, the cost of the universal
mandate,
M =
Z p
0
[MC (p) MV (p)] dD (p) ,
decreases when p decreases, since MC (p)  MV (p) for p  p. Hence, the cost
di¤erential increases. If the cost increase S dominates the increase in  , the net gain
   S decreases as well.
Proof of Policy Result 2
Consider rst the case without frictions. With perfect risk-rating,  () =    ,
the average cost equals E (    () j + r  p+  ()) =  and is independent of the
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price. Hence, pc = . An individual thus buys insurance if and only if
 + r  pc +  (), r  0.
This is the rst-best. Hence, perfect risk-rating improves welfare in an adversely se-
lected market.
Consider now the case with " =   and independent risk and preferences. With-
out risk-rating, the average cost equals E (j + r  p) =  due to the independent
preferences. Hence, pc = . An individual thus buys insurance if and only if
 + r  pc , r  0.
This is the rst-best. With perfect risk-rating, the competitive price still equals pc = .
However, an individual buys insurance only if r  , which is ine¢ cient. The generated
surplus E (rjr  ) Pr (r  ) is lower than E (rjr  0) Pr (r  0).
Proof of Policy Result 3
The rst policy reduces the noise dispersion such that the correlation between r
and r + " increases, but the covariance matrix of (r + "; ) remains unchanged. Since
var (v^) = var (r + ") + var () + 2cov (r + "; ) ,
this implies that the demand function D (p) = 1  Fv^ (p) is una¤ected. Moreover,
cov (; v^)p
var (v^)
=
var () + cov (; r + ")p
var (v^)
and thus the average cost AC (p) is una¤ected. Hence, the competitive price pc remains
the same. Since
cov (r; v^)p
var (v^)
=
cov (r; r + ") + cov (r; )p
var (v^)
increases, the expected net-value at a price p,
E (rjv^  p) = r +
cov (r; v^)p
var (v^)


p v^p
var(v^)

1 

p v^p
var(v^)
 ,
increases. Hence, the welfare surplus,Z 1
pc
E (rjv^ = p) dF (p) = Pr (v^  pc)E (rjv^  p) ,
increases unambiguously. This proves the rst part of the Policy Result.
The second policy reduces the noise dispersion such that the correlation between 
and  + " increases but the covariance matrix of ( + "; r) remains unchanged. This
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again leaves the demand function D (p) = 1  Fv^ (p) is una¤ected. Moreover,
cov (r; v^)
var (v^)
=
var (r) + cov (r;  + ")
var (v^)
and thus the conditional expected net-value E (rjv^ = p) remains una¤ected as well.
Since
cov (; v^)p
var (v^)
=
cov (;  + ") + cov (; r)p
var (v^)
increases, the average cost
AC (p) =  +
cov (; v^)p
var (v^)


p v^p
var(v^)

1 

p v^p
var(v^)
 ,
increases for any p. Hence, the competitive price pc = AC (pc) increases. If the market
already exhibits under-insurance (i.e., pc > p), the increase in the competitive price
unambiguously decreases welfare. This proves the second part of the Policy Result.
Finally, notice that the proposed changes in the noise distribution are feasible. For
the second policy, a reduction d" and a corresponding change d;" =  "+;"" d"
leaves var ( + ") = 2 +
2
" +2;"" unchanged and increases cov (; ") = ;""
and thus cov (;  + "). Moreover, if r;" 6= 0, the change dr;" =  r;"" d" keeps
cov ( + "; r) unchanged. The argument is analogue for the rst policy.
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